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Abstract. Botnets are a serious threat on the Internet and require huge resources
to be thwarted. ISPs are in the best position to fight botnets and there are a number
of recently proposed initiatives that focus on how ISPs should detect and reme-
diate bots. However, it is very expensive for ISPs to do it alone and they would
probably welcome some external funding. Among others, botnets severely af-
fect ad networks (ANs), as botnets are increasingly used for ad fraud. Thus, ANs
have an economic incentive, but they are not in the best position to fight botnet
ad fraud. Consequently, ANs might be willing to subsidize the ISPs to do so. We
provide a game-theoretic model to study the strategic behavior of ISPs and ANs
and we identify the conditions under which ANs are likely to solve the problem
of botnet ad fraud by themselves and those under which the AN will subsidize
the ISP to achieve this goal. Our analytical and numerical results show that the
optimal strategy depends on the ad revenue loss of the ANs due to ad fraud and
the number of bots participating in ad fraud.
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1 Introduction
Today, botnets are a very popular tool for perpetrating distributed attacks on the Internet.
Botnets are a serious threat for a number of entities: end users, enterprises with online
businesses, websites, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), advertisers and ad networks
(ANs). Botnets usually consist of compromised end users’ PCs. Thus, depending on the
malware, the consequences for end users can be severe (e.g., stolen credentials). Very
often botnets are used for sending spam, which creates problems for ISPs, enterprises
and end users. Botnet operators (aka bot masters) also use botnets to extort money from
websites’ owners under the threat of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS).
Lately, it is becoming more and more popular to use botnets for ad fraud [4], which
creates a loss of ad revenue for advertisers, associated websites and ad networks and
security threats for end users (e.g., fraudulent ads that lead to phishing attacks).
Consequently, thwarting botnets would benefit everyone and would reduce the level
of online crime on the Internet. However, the problem of botnets in general cannot be
solved exclusively by users (lack of know-how), ISPs (too expensive to fight botnets
alone), ad networks, advertisers, websites and enterprises (lack of tools and resources).
Recent initiatives propose that ISPs should perform the detection of botnets and
remediation of the infected devices [20] [24]. Indeed, it is the ISPs that are in the best
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position to detect the presence of a botnet and to take measures against it. Yet, the
revenue of ISPs are not (directly) affected by the botnets and ISPs would probably
welcome some external funding in the efforts to fight botnets. One possible approach
is a government-sponsored program, as in Australia [7] and Germany [10]. In the case
governments are unwilling to fund these initiatives, ISPs need to find a way to make
them, at the very least, cost neutral if not cost positive.
Over the last decade, online advertising has become a major component of the Web,
leading to annual revenues expressed in tens of billions of US Dollars (e.g., $22.4 billion
in the US in 2009 [5]). The business model of a fast growing number of online services
is based on online advertising and much of the Internet activity depends on that source
of revenue. Unsurprisingly, the ad revenue has caught the eye of many ill-intentioned
people who have started abusing the advertising system in various ways. In particular,
click fraud has become a phenomenon of alarming proportions [4]. Recently, a new
type of ad fraud attack has appeared, consisting in the on-the-fly modification of the
ads themselves. A prominent example is the Bahama botnet, in which malware causes
infected systems to display altered ads, as well as altered results for Google or Yahoo
searches to the end users [17]. Another example of such a botnet is Gumblar [16]. If the
modification of ads is successful, users see ads that are different from what they would
otherwise be. Consequently, users’ clicks on the altered ads generate a revenue for the
bot master instead of the AN. Thus, the modification of the ads negatively affects the
revenues of the “legitimate” advertisers and undermines the business model of the ANs.
Considering the increasing trend of botnet ad-fraud attacks and the consequently
increasing loss of ad revenue for ad networks, ANs have economic incentives to fight
botnets. However, ANs are not in the best position to thwart botnets themselves and
thus ANs might be willing to subsidize the ISPs to achieve that goal. In this paper, we
investigate whether ad fraud botnets alone are cause enough for ISPs and ANs to coop-
erate. Such cooperation would help ISPs deploy detection and remediation mechanisms
and would be a first step towards fighting all botnets.
The contributions of our paper are threefold. First, we identify two potential coun-
termeasures that ANs could use to address the problem of botnet ad fraud and we pro-
pose a cooperation scheme in which ISPs and ANs jointly fight botnets. Second, we
provide a game-theoretic model to study the interactions between ISPs and ANs, as
well as to identify an optimal countermeasure strategy of ANs and ISPs under different
conditions. Finally, we apply the results to a real data set to study the practical impact.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to model the behavior of ISPs and
ad networks facing botnet ad fraud.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief presentation of the state of
the art in Section 2, we describe the impact of botnets on the online advertising business
in Section 3. We then address the various threats and countermeasures in Section 4
and provide a case study of a botnet ad fraud in Section 5. In Section 6, we present a
game-theoretic model with two players, the ISP and the AN, and identify equilibrium
outcomes of that game. We provide a numerical example to study the practical impact
of the obtained results in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
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2 Related Work
There are two main categories of literature that are relevant to our work: research on
fraud in online advertising and analyses of security investments on the Internet.
Research on online advertising fraud is mostly focused on click fraud [12] [15] [21].
Many problems that stem from online advertising and security gaps, especially the
consequences for the end users, are addressed in [13]. The economics of click fraud
are briefly addressed in [21]. In [8], the economic analysis based on a game-theoretic
model of the online advertising market, shows that ad networks that deploy effective
algorithms for click fraud detection gain a significant competitive advantage. If it is the
case that some ad networks do not fight click fraud, mechanisms are proposed in [14] to
protect online advertisers from paying for fraudulent clicks. In comparison, our model
does not address click fraud detection mechanisms but introduces a new strategic player
- the ISP - in addition to the traditional players in online advertising (i.e., ad networks,
advertisers and publishers). Our results show that this player can yield significant im-
plications for the security of the Internet.
In [30], the authors investigate novel man-in-the-middle attacks on online advertis-
ing systems, which can be perpetrated by access networks (e.g., an ISP) to exploit online
advertising systems. The authors propose a collaborative secure scheme that relies on
web servers and ad networks to fix the identified vulnerabilities of online advertising
systems. This solution also relies on the fact that most of online advertising networks
own digital authentication certificates and can become a source of trust. The authors ex-
plain why the deployment of this solution would benefit the Web browsing security in
general. In this paper we propose new approaches to thwart distributed ad fraud attacks,
where we address the possibility of collaboration between ISPs and ad networks.
Related to the second issue - finding the right incentives to increase the security
on the Internet - there are several contributions in the literature. The game-theoretic ap-
proach of [18] models how users choose between investments in security (e.g., firewalls)
or insurance (e.g., backup) mechanisms. The positive effect of cyberinsurance on the in-
vestment of agents in self-protection is analyzed using a game-theoretic model in [23].
The main conclusion of this work is that cyberinsurance without regulation does not
provide sufficient incentives for self-protection. Another line of work proposes a cen-
tralized certification mechanism to encourage ISPs to secure their traffic and analyzes
the resulting scheme using game theory [33]. In contrast to these works, our analysis
shows that Internet security can be increased, under given conditions, without any cen-
tral oversight and thanks to self-interested decisions by only a few key players (namely,
the ad networks and the ISPs).
In [31], the authors investigate the recent problem of ISPs becoming strategic partic-
ipants in the online advertising business. They propose a game-theoretic model of this
problem to study the behavior and interactions of the ISPs and ANs. Their results show
that if the users private information can improve ad targeting significantly and if ad net-
works do not have to pay a high share of revenue to the ISPs, ad networks and ISPs will
cooperate to jointly provide targeted online ads. Otherwise, ISPs will divert part of the
online ad revenue for themselves. In that case, if the diverted revenue is small, ad net-
works will not react. However, if their revenue loss is significant, the ad networks will
invest into improving the security of the Web and protecting their ad revenue. Our work
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also concludes that, when facing ad fraud, ANs are willing to collaborate with ISPs in
order to protect their ad revenue. However, since we consider a distributed threat (in
contrast to the centralized model in [31]) we propose new collaborative approach that
takes into consideration the economic incentives of the ANs and ISPs.
3 System Model
We consider a system consisting of an online advertising system, a number of bots that
attempt to exploit the online advertising system and an ISP, as depicted in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. System model: Online advertising system, ISP and bots exploiting the advertising system.
3.1 Online Advertising Systems
The most prevalent model of serving online ads to end users is depicted in Figure 1.
To have their ads appear with the appropriate web content, Advertisers (AV) subscribe
with an ad network (AN) whose role is to automatically embed ads into web pages. Ad
networks have contracts with Websites (WS) that want to host advertisements. When
a User (U) visits a website (Figure 1, step 1) that hosts ads, while downloading the
content of the web page (step 2), the user’s browser will be directed to communicate
with one of the Ad Servers (AS) belonging to the ad network (step 3). The AS chooses
and serves (step 4) the most appropriate ads to the user, such that users’ interests are
matched and the potential revenue is maximized. Throughout the rest of the paper, we
use the terms “user” and “user’s browser” interchangeably.
In the most popular ad revenue model [5], advertisers pay a cost-per-click (CPC)
to the ad network for each user-generated click that directs the user’s browser to the
advertised website. The AN gives a fraction of the ad generated revenue to the WS that
hosted the ad. Popular websites that attract more visitors create more traffic towards
advertised websites, thus generating more revenue for themselves and for the associated
ad networks. Since we consider a single AN in our system model, we assume that all
the websites that host online ads are associated to that AN.
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3.2 Botnets
A botnet is a collection of software robots, or bots, that run autonomously and automat-
ically. Bots are typically compromised computers running software, usually installed
via drive-by downloads exploiting Web browser vulnerabilities, worms, Trojan horses
or backdoors, under a common command-and-control infrastructure. Recently, a botnet
of compromised wireless routers has been detected [25]. Such a botnet has the advan-
tage of having the bots almost always connected to the Internet (compared to the typical
end-user machine that is connected to the Internet only from time to time). In addition,
it is more difficult to detect that a device has been compromised, due to the lack of
security software for such devices (e.g., no anti-virus software) or by a user.
A bot master controls the botnet remotely, usually through a covert channel (e.g.,
Internet Relay Chat) and usually for nefarious purposes. According to Click Forensics,
a company that produces tools to detect and filter fraudulent clicks, for the third quarter
of 2009, 42.6% of fraudulent clicks came from bots (Figure 2)1 [4]. The number is
the highest in four years (since Click Forensics has been producing the reports). For
the same period in 2008, botnets accounted for 27.5% of fraudulent clicks. The data
show that using botnets for ad fraud is becoming more and more popular. This creates a
problem for advertisers, ad networks and websites as they lose a part of the ad revenue.
In the system model, we consider a number of compromised devices that run a malware
that causes infected machines to participate in an advertising fraud.
Fig. 2. Significance of botnet ad fraud: Botnet Click Fraud by Quarter.
3.3 Internet Service Providers
The traditional role of an ISP is to provide Internet access to end users and to forward
users’ traffic in compliance with the Network Neutrality policy [11]. However, recently,
ISPs have begun taking on additional roles. In the EU, ISPs have to obtain and keep
the records about their users’ online activities and provide them upon request to law
enforcement agencies [1].
1 Permission for inclusion obtained from ClickForensics Inc.
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A new IETF intitiative focuses on how ISPs can manage the effects of devices used
by their subscribers, detect those that have been infected with malicious bots, notify the
subscribers and remediate the infection via various techniques [20]. The Internet Indus-
try Association (IIA) has also drafted a new code of conduct that suggests ISPs should
detect malware-infected machines of their subscribers and actually take the action to
address the problem [24]. Complying with these initiatives, ISPs would make it more
difficult for botnets to operate, thus helping to reduce the level of online crime on the
Web. However, the problem is that ISPs have to find funding for those initiatives.
One possible approach is a government-sponsored program, such as the Australian
Internet Security Initiative, in which a third-party helps identify malware-infected de-
vices, notifies the appropriate ISP which then notifies and helps the subscriber to rem-
edy the problem. About 90% of Australian ISP subscribers are covered by this initia-
tive. A similar program is ready to be launched in 2010 in Germany, where ISPs are
cooperating with the German Federal Office for Information Security [10]. In the case
governments are unwilling to fund the initiative, ISPs need to find a way to make it, at
the very least, cost neutral if not cost positive. In our model, we consider an ISP that is
willing to comply to the initiative, if doing so is at least cost neutral.
4 Ad Fraud: Threats and Countermeasures
Due to the immense revenues generated by online advertising, the temptation to exploit
the online advertising system is high. The loss of revenue for ad networks due to ad
fraud is substantial. Based on the report from Click Forensics, the overall click-fraud
rate was around 14.1% in the third quarter of 2009 [4], which means that 14.1% of
the clicks on the ads were bogus. Thus, click fraud alone creates a significant loss of
revenue for ad networks, advertisers and publishers. In addition, ANs lose ad revenue
due to new types of ad fraud, such as injecting ads into the content of webpages on-the-
fly between a web server and a user [19, 26, 29].
One possible approach for ad networks to protect their revenue is to improve the se-
curity of the online advertising systems, thus making it more difficult for an adversary to
successfully exploit those systems. In [31], the authors use game theory to model AN’s
economic incentives and show that when facing ad fraud attacks securing ad systems
may maximize the revenue of a rational AN. For example, ad fraud can be reduced if
webpages and ads are served over HTTPS instead of HTTP. The cost of implementing
HTTPS at a web server includes the cost of obtaining a valid X.509 authentication cer-
tificate. Usually, website owners are not willing to bear this cost. Thus, if an ad network
wants the secure protocol to be deployed, it should cover the costs itself. As explained
previously, websites are not of the same value to the ad network, because of the differ-
ent ad revenue they generate, but the cost of securing the ad revenue from a website is
the same for all websites. Therefore, the ad network may decide to selectively secure
only the websites that generate sufficient ad revenue that would compensate the costs.
Another possible approach for ad networks to protect their revenue is to cooperate
with ISPs and eliminate the major cause of the revenue loss, botnets. They can do so by
funding the existing initiatives for IPSs to detect and remove botnets, since ISPs are in
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a privileged position to fight botnets. As removing botnets would benefit ad networks,
they have economic incentives to subsidize ISPs to fight botnets.
Thus, we can envision the following two scenarios of ad networks fighting ad fraud:
(i) improving the security of the online advertising systems or (ii) funding ISPs to fight
botnets involved in ad frauds.
5 Botnet Ad Fraud: A Case Study
Consider the system as described in Section 3, in which NB devices (e.g., end-users’s
computers or routers) have been infected by a malware and participate in ad fraud.
We consider exclusively the types of ad fraud: (i) that has been the most prominent
lately [16,17], in which malware causes infected devices to return altered Search Engine
Result Pages (SERPs) or altered content of the ads in web pages, due to DNS poisoning
and (ii) in which subverted users’ routers modify ad traffic on-the-fly between a web
server and a user [29]. In the example of Bahama botnet, malware uses DNS poisoning
by modifying HOSTS files on infected machines to redirect traffic to rogue Google
servers which return altered results [9]. Thus, affected users see ads and links that are
different from what they would otherwise be. When users click on the altered ads, the
clicks generate revenue for the bot master instead of the ad network. Thus, the bots
divert a part of the ad revenue from the ad network. For simplicity of treatment, we
assume that each bot diverts an equal part of the revenue and in aggregate, all the bots
together divert λ ∈ (0, 1] fraction of the total ad network’s revenue P . Thus, the revenue
of the AN in the case of ad fraud is P (1− λ).
The popularity of websites, and consequently the number of user-generated clicks
on ads, follow a heavy-tail distribution [6]. We infer the generated volume of clicks
on ads on the 1000 most popular websites, based on the data of page views on each
website in 2009, obtained from Compete.com. The exposure of users to online ads has
been evaluated extensively in [22], showing that 58% of the top 1000 websites host
advertisements and there are 8 ads per web page on average. The probability that a
click occurs on an advertisement is 0.1% [2]. Consequently, to convert the number of
page views into the number of clicks on ads on each website, we use the following
formula: Q(n)=(Page views on the website n )×0.58× 8× 0.001. Figure 3 shows the
annual number of clicksQ(n) on ads , where n ∈ {1, 2, · · · 1000} is the popularity rank
of a website.
Applying curve fitting to the data set, we obtain that the distribution of clicks on
ads across websites corresponds to the power law Q(n) = α · n−β , where Q(n) is the
annual number of clicks on ads that occurred at the website with the n-th rank. The
obtained parameters of the power law are α = 3.18 · 109 and β = 1.044 as shown
in Figure 3. In general, we assume that the number of clicks on ads follows the power
law distribution Q(n) = α · n−β , where Q(n) is the annual number of clicks on ads
that occurred at the website with the n-th rank and β > 1 [6]. Note that the value of
parameters α and β are a characteristic of a given AN and depend on the number and
the type of associated websites. In order to extend our analysis and investigate what
would be the effect on the entire Web (i.e., for all websites), we extrapolate the data set
we have obtained from Compete.com with the obtained power law.
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Fig. 3. Annual number of clicks for the 1000 most popular websites and the power law fitting
curve, Q(n) = αn−β = 3.18 · 109n−1.044.
Given the power law distribution of the clicks, the ad revenue generated by the top
x websites can be estimated by2
k
∫ x
1
αn−βdn = k
α
(β − 1)(1− x
1−β),
where k is the amount of revenue that each click on ads generates for the ad network3.
If P is the total revenue of the ad network, generated by all the websites (i.e., when
x → ∞), then per-click revenue can be calculated by k = P (β−1)α . According to the
reports [5], the total ad revenue P in 2009 in the US is 22.4 billion dollars.
In the following two subsections, we analyze the two proposed strategies (i.e., im-
proving the security of the online advertising system and cooperation between the AN
and the ISP) to fight botnet ad fraud. Table 1 shows the used notation.
5.1 Securing Websites
As a countermeasure to the considered type of ad fraud (i.e., rogue servers deliver-
ing altered ads due to DNS poisoning attack on users machines or on-the-fly traffic
modifications by compromised users’ routers), the AN can secure the communication
between users and web servers as well as between users and ad servers. For example,
secure communication can be provided by the HTTPS protocol. Deploying HTTPS re-
quires web servers to obtain an authentication certificate from a trusted third party. In
the case when websites and ad servers deploy HTTPS with valid authentication certifi-
cates, even if an adversary successfully mounts a DNS poisoning attack and redirects
users’ communication to rogue servers, the rogues servers cannot serve valid authenti-
cation certificates that correspond to the domain names users originally wanted to visit,
2 Due to the impossibility of obtaining closed-form expressions in the discrete domain, we per-
form computations in the continuous domain. The upper bound of the error is 8% [32].
3 Modeling auctions and different per click revenue for ad networks is out of the scope of this
paper, thus we assume that all the clicks are of the same quality.
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Table 1. Table of symbols.
Symbol Definition
NB Number of bots
λ Fraction of diverted ad revenue by the botnet
P Total online advertising revenue of the AN
k Amount of generated revenue for each click
Q(n) Number of clicks per year for the top 1000 websites
n Popularity rank of the websites
α and β Estimated parameters of power law distribution for Q(n)
cS Cost of securing a website
NS Optimal number of secured websites with S strategy
NSC Optimal number of secured websites with S + C strategy
PD Fraction of bots detected by the ISP
cD Cost of the botnet detection system
cR Cost for the ISP per remediated infected device
R Cost for the AN per remediated infected device
NR Optimal number of remediated infected devices
C Cooperation strategy (employed by the ISP or the AN)
S Secure websites strategy by the AN
S + C Simultaneous Secure and Cooperation strategy by the AN
A Abstain Strategy (employed by the ISP or the AN)
thus browsers will detect security issues. HTTPS also prevents on-the-fly modifications
of the content. Consequently, users would receive unaltered links and ads and the clicks
on unaltered ads would generate revenue for the intended AN, not the adversary.
As discussed in Section 4, website owners usually lack incentive to bear the cost
of obtaining a valid certificate. Thus, to secure the communication, and consequently
the ad revenue, the AN would have to pay a cost of securing the website. The cost of
deploying HTTPS at ad servers can be considered negligible, given that the AN already
has a valid certificate and that there are typically only a few ad servers (compared to the
number of web servers).
Let cS be the cost of securing a website, i.e., the cost of obtaining a certificate and
deploying HTTPS at a web server. Then the AN should pay NS · cS to secure NS
websites. NS is the optimal number of websites that AN secures to maximize its payoff
in the presence of NB bots diverting fraction λ of the revenue. It can be calculated by
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If the ad network fights botnet ad fraud by securing the websites, the optimal
number of those secured websites is equal to NS =
(
P
cS
λ(β − 1)
) 1
β
.
Proof. The total amount of revenue for the ad network (uAN ) when it secures x web-
sites, due to the attack of NB bots diverting fraction λ of the revenue, can be estimated
by
uAN = k
∫ x
1
αn−βdn+ (1− λ)k
∫ ∞
x
αn−βdn− cSx.
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Recall that k is the revenue generated per each click and can be calculated as P (β−1)α .
The first term in the revenue equation represents the revenue that the AN obtains from
clicks generated on secured websites. The second term shows that the AN obtains only
the remaining fraction (1− λ) of the revenue from clicks generated on unsecured web-
sites, as the bots divert the fraction λ of the revenue.
After simplifications we obtain: uAN = P (1− λx1−β)− cSx, which is a concave
function of x. We can obtain the optimal NS by finding the root of the first derivation
of uAN with respect to x, that is
(
P
cS
λ(β − 1)
) 1
β
. uunionsq
5.2 ISP and Ad Network Cooperation
In addition to the just described countermeasure of securing websites, the AN can offer
the ISP to cooperate in the fight against botnets. The AN has an economic incentive
to fund the ISP to perform detection of the botnets and remediation of the infected
devices, as discussed in Section 3. To detect bots in the network, the ISP must deploy
a detection system [20, 24]. We note the deployment cost of the detection system as cD
and we assume that such a system can successfully detect a fraction PD of the bots in
the network. The proposed initiatives [20,24] envision an online help desk where all the
subscribers whose devices have been detected as bots can obtain instructions on how to
remediate the problem and restore the functionality of their devices. Thus, the ISP has
a cost per each remediated infected device, which we note as cR.
For the ISP to cooperate with the AN, the AN has to provide a sufficient reward such
that the detection and remediation is at least cost neutral for the ISP. Let R represent
the reward the AN should pay to the ISP for the remediation of each infected device.4
If the AN and the ISP agree to cooperate, the outcome is that the ISP remediatesNR
infected devices and the AN pays NR · R to the ISP. The optimal NR that maximizes
both revenues, of the ISP and the AN, can be calculated by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The cooperative ISP and the cooperative AN can maximize their revenues
by remediation of NR = PDNB infected devices.
Proof. The total amount of revenue that the ISP can obtain by cooperation and re-
mediation of x infected devices is x(R − cR) − cD which is a linear function of
x. Therefore, the ISP can maximize its revenue by remediating all of detected bots
PDNB . Remediation of x infected devices reduces the aggregate power of the bots
in the network, and together they can divert only a fraction λ(1 − xNB ) of the rev-
enue. The total amount of revenue that the AN can obtain by cooperation is then
P (1 − λ(1 − xNB )) − xR =
(
Pλ
NB
−R
)
x + P (1 − λ), which is a linear function
with respect to x and will be maximized at x = NR = PDNB , i.e., for all of the de-
tected bots. uunionsq
In summary, the ad network can use one of the above two actions to fight botnet ad
fraud in the Internet. Each strategy has different benefits and costs for the ISP and the
4 Our model also applies to the case when ISPs and ANs jointly bear the costs (i.e., when it is
cost negative for ISPs to thwart the botnets) by adapting the values R or cR.
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Table 2. Static game: ISP chooses an action from {A,C};AN from {A,C, S+C, S}. Strategy
profiles (C,A) and (S + C,A) are not applicable unless when ISP plays C.
ISP
A C
AN
A (0, P (1− λ)) (−cD, P (1− λ))
C N/A
(
NR(R− cR)− cD, P (1− λ(1− NRNB ))−NRR
)
S+C N/A
(
NR(R− cR)− cD, P (1− λ(1− NRNB )N
1−β
SC )−NSCcS −NRR
)
S
(
0, P (1− λN1−βS )−NScS
) (
−cD, P (1− λN1−βS )−NScS
)
AN. In the next section, we use game theory to model this situation and consequently
predict the behavior of the AN and the ISP in different situations.
6 Game-Theoretic Model
In this section, we introduce a static gameG to analyze the interaction between the ISP
and the AN. Our model considers potential strategies of the ISP and the AN to protect
the systems against the above defined threats. Considering the benefits and the costs of
different strategies we also present the equilibria for the defined game. The key points
of our game-theoretic analysis is that by using the computed equilibria it is possible to
choose the optimal countermeasure protocol for different situations. Note that our game
is a perfect and complete information game. We assume that the players have common
knowledge about their strategies and payoffs and can observe the actions of each other.
6.1 Game Model: Strategies and Payoffs
Table 2 shows the normal form of the proposed static gameG. In this game, the players
play simultaneously. The ISP can choose between the following two actions: Abstain
(A) and Cooperate (C). The Abstain action models the behavior of the ISP that is not
willing to participate in the detection and rememediation of the bots . Hence the payoff
of the ISP is 0, when it plays A. The cooperative ISP (that plays C) first detects the
bots and then remediates the infected devices. In return, the ISP receives a rewardNRR
from the AN. Recall that the cost for the ISP to remediate all detected devices is cRNR.
Consequently, when the ISP and the AN cooperate, the payoff of the ISP is NR(R −
cR)− cD.
In our model, the AN can choose one of the following four possible actions: Abstain
(A), Cooperate (C), Secure and Cooperate (S + C), and Secure (S). With the Abstain
action we model the behavior of the AN that is not willing to perform any countermea-
sures. In this case, the payoff of the AN will decrease to P (1−λ). Recall that λ ∈ [0, 1]
is the fraction of diverted ad revenue by the bots.
If the AN cooperates with the ISP, its utility will increase to P
(
1− λ(1− NRNB )
)
,
where NR is the optimal number of infected devices remediated by the ISP, which can
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be calculated by Lemma 2. However, the AN should pay NRR to the ISP for NR reme-
diated devices. As a result, the total payoff of the AN when both players are cooperative
is P
(
1− λ(1− NRNB )
)
−NRR.
The AN can also secure the websites by choosing the action S, as discussed in
Section 5.1. The AN should pay NScS to secure NS websites. The benefit of the AN
will then increase to P (1− λN1−βS ). Consequently, the total payoff of the AN when it
plays S is P (1− λN1−βS )−NScS , independently of whether the ISP plays C or A.
Finally, the AN can choose to simultaneously secure some of the websites and coop-
erate with the ISP to remediate some of the infected devices. This action is represented
by S + C and the total payoff of the AN in this case is P (1 − λN1−βSC (1 − NRNB )) −
NSCcS − NRR, where NSC is the optimal number of secured websites when the AN
plays S + C and can be obtained by the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If the AN fights botnet ad fraud with both countermeasures (action S +C),
the optimal number of secured websites is equal to NSC =
(
P
cS
λ(β − 1)(1− NRNB )
) 1
β
.
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 1. We can obtain the optimal NSC , by maximiz-
ing the total payoff of the AN when it plays S + C. uunionsq
Lemma 3 shows that when the AN plays S +C a smaller number (NSC) of websites is
secured, compared to the number (NS) of secured websites when the AN plays S (i.e.,
NSC = NS(1− NRNB )
1
β < NS).
6.2 Game Results
In order to predict and choose the optimal action for the ISP and the AN, we investigate
all Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the defined game. In other words, we are in-
terested in finding the strategy profiles, where neither the ISP nor the AN can increase
their payoffs by unilaterally changing their strategies. We will check the existence of
Nash equilibria by comparing the payoffs obtained in the gameG.
The following theorem states conditions when the AN does not provide sufficient
incentive to the ISP, such that the ISP will abstain at the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. InG, if R < cDNR + cR, the best response of the ISP is to play action A.
Proof. By comparing the ISP’s payoff when it plays C (i.e., whether −cD or NR(R −
cR) − cD) with that of A (i.e., 0) we obtain that the best response of the ISP is A if
NR(R− cR)− cD < 0 or R < cDNR + cR. uunionsq
This means that if the reward for remediation of the infected devices is small, the ISP
will not be willing to cooperate with the AN to fight the bots.
The following theorem states when the revenue loss due to ad fraud is not significant
enough to cause the AN and the ISP to perform any countermeasure against the bots.
Theorem 2. InG, if R < cDNR + cR and λ ≤ NScSP (1−N1−βS ) , the action A by the ISP and
the AN result in a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Considering Theorem 1, the ISP chooses A as its best response. The AN also
plays A if its payoff when playing A (i.e., P (1 − λ)) is bigger than its payoff when
playing S (i.e., P (1 − λN1−βS ) − NScS). Comparing these two payoffs results in the
second condition of this theorem, i.e., λ ≤ NScS
P (1−N1−βS )
. uunionsq
In other words, if the reward provided by the AN does not generate sufficient incentives
for the ISP to cooperate, and the amount of revenue diverted by the bots is smaller than
a given threshold, both the ISP and the AN choose A to be at Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3 shows when the AN fights the bots alone by securing some of the websites.
Theorem 3. In G, if R < cDNR + cR and λ >
NScS
P (1−N1−βS )
, action A by the ISP and
action S by the AN result in a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 2. uunionsq
This result shows that the amount of diverted ad revenue is significant such that a coun-
termeasure should be deployed, but the ISP does not have enough incentive to cooperate
and fight bots at this equilibrium. Consequently, the AN secures some of the websites.
Let us assume that λ is very small. Considering all the possible actions and the
corresponding payoffs for the AN, the Abstain results in maximum payoff for the AN. In
fact, actionA avoids unnecessary costs for the AN, such asNScS orNRR = PDNBR.
These results are also in line with Theorem 2 meaning that playing A by both players
results in a Nash equilibrium when λ is very small.
When λ increases (i.e., more ad revenue is diverted by the bots) the AN should
deviate from A and select one of the three remaining actions as its best response. The
following lemma states when the AN should begin securing NS websites.
Conjecture 1. In G, the AN should start securing the websites (Play S) when λ >
NScS
P (1−N1−βS )
, which corresponds to the equilibrium presented by Theorem 3.
Proof. We should compare the payoffs of the AN when it plays S or C, with the one
obtained by playing the action A. The AN should then play C if λ > RNBP = λ1 and
should play S if λ > NScS
P (1−N1−βS )
= λ2. One can show that λ1 > λ2 when λ, and
consequently NS , is small enough. This means that the AN switches from A to S at
equilibrium, when λ increases. uunionsq
Note that the AN does not switch from the A to the S + C, when λ increases, because
the AN can protect the revenue first by playing S. In other words, the AN does not need
to pay NRR to the ISP, since the cost would exceed the revenue loss. Consequently, the
equilibrium ofG corresponds to the one presented by Theorem 3. Finally, the following
conjecture shows when the AN plays S + C in the response to the cooperative ISP.
Conjecture 2. In G, if the ISP is cooperative, the best response of the AN is action
S + C if λ > NRR−NScSG
PN1−βS G
, where G = 1− (1− NRNB )
1
β .
Proof. The above threshold can be obtained by comparing the payoffs of the AN when
it plays S + C and S. uunionsq
Conjecture 2 shows that if the bots divert even more revenue from the ad network, the
AN will cooperate with the ISP and pay NRR to the ISP to remediate NR bots. It will
then secure a smaller number of websites compared to the case when it plays S.
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7 Numerical Analysis
In order to understand implications of the analytical results (presented in Section 6) in
reality, we simulate the game using the real data. We compute numerically the payoffs
of the static game (Table 2), identify the resulting equilibria and present conclusions. To
investigate the effect on the entire Web (i.e., for all websites), we extrapolate the data
set we have obtained from Compete.com with the obtained power law, as explained in
Section 5.
We use the following estimated costs in our evaluations: (i) the cost of deploying
HTTPS at a web server is cS = $400 [28]; (ii) the cost of remediating an infected
device cR = $100 (given that it is done via online support [20], it is the estimated
cost of human labor for remediating one device per hour); (iii) the cost of the intrusion
detection system cD = $100k [27].
We take into account different values of the fraction λ ∈ (0, 1] of the ad revenue
that the AN loses due to botnet ad fraud and the number of bots NB . Given that the
largest botnets detected so far [3] had several million bots each, we consider the total
number of infected devices that participate in the ad fraud considered in our case study
to be up to 100 million (regardless of whether they form a single or multiple botnets).
We represent the outcomes of the game for NB = 104 in Figure 4. Figure 4(a)
shows the number of secured websites depending on the level of threat λ. When the
AN cooperates with the ISP, the fraction of remediated devices depending on the level
of threat λ is shown in Figure 4(b). We consider three scenarios (the three curves in
Figure 4), for three different efficiencies of the detection system employed by the ISP
(i.e., when the fraction of detected bots is PD = 0.1, PD = 0.5 and PD = 0.9).
When the threat of the botnet ad fraud is very small, λ < 2 · 10−6, the AN does
not perceive the need to perform any countermeasure against bots. Thus, there are no
websites that are secured (NS = 0 in Figure 4(a))5 and no devices are remediated
(NR = 0 in Figure 4(b)). This result corresponds to Theorem 2.
5 Absence of curves in Figure 4(a) signifies log(0), i.e., that zero websites are secured.
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Fig. 4. Outcomes of the game applied to real data when NB = 104: (a) Number of the most
popular websites that should be secured; (b) Fraction of infected devices remediated by the ISP.
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When the bots divert a higher fraction of ad revenue, λ > 2 · 10−6, the AN first
secures a number of websites (Figure 4(a)). As there is no cooperation with the ISP
(NR = 0 in Figure 4(b)) the number of secured websites does not depend on PD, thus
it is the same in all three scenarios. The result corresponds to the finding of Theorem 3,
i.e., the best choice for the AN is to play Secure and for the ISP to Abstain. The intuition
behind this result is that the relatively small threat λ is distributed over NB infected
devices, thus each bot diverts a small amount of ad revenue. The cost of remediating the
infected device would be higher than the loss of ad revenue the bot causes, thus it does
not pay off for the AN to cooperate with the ISP. However, the loss is significant enough
that the AN has to deploy a countermeasure, hence it secures some of the websites. The
number of secured websites corresponds to the Lemma 1.
We observe that the higher λ is, the higher is the number of websites to be secured
(Figure 4(a)), until λ reaches a threshold value (λ1 = 1.12 · 10−4, λ2 = 6.6 · 10−5
and λ3 = 6 · 10−5 for PD = 0.1, PD = 0.5 and PD = 0.9, respectively). At the
threshold values the AN starts cooperating with the ISP (NR becomes greater than zero,
Figure 4(b)). Thus, the threshold value of λ represents the level of threat after which it
is not enough to only secure the websites, but the AN will also cooperate with the ISP
to fight bots (i.e., plays S + C). This result corresponds to Lemma 2.
When the AN plays S+C, each countermeasure protects a given part of the revenue
that is otherwise diverted by the bots. The total loss of revenue for the AN due to ad
fraud committed byNB bots is Pλ. The remediation ofNR infected devices reduces the
loss of revenue to Pλ(1− NRNB ). As the part of the revenue loss is now eliminated by the
ISP, the remaining part is smaller and consequently the AN secures a smaller number
of websites. This explains the drop in the number of secured websites (Figure 4(a)),
which happens at the threshold value of λ when the AN starts cooperating with the ISP.
When λ increases (for values of λ greater than the thresholds), since NR is constant for
a given PD (Figure 4(b)), in order to eliminate the increasing loss, the AN secures an
increasing number of websites for the increasing λ (Figure 4(a)).
In Figure 4(b), we observe that the number of remediated devices is equal to PDNB ,
which confirms analytical results stated by Lemma 2. The higher the PD is, the bigger
the benefit of cooperation is, because a larger number of devices is remediated. Conse-
quently, the AN secures a smaller number of websites for a higher PD (Figure 4(a)).
In summary, the obtained results illustrate that: (i) For a very low level of threat λ,
no countermeasures will be taken against bots; (ii) When the fraction λ of the diverted
revenue increases, the AN secures a number of websites; (iii) Securing websites is not
sufficient for an even higher level of threats, thus the AN will cooperate with the ISP to
remediate infected devices.
Next, we analyze the effect of the number of bots NB in the system on the equilib-
rium outcomes of the game.
Figure 5 represents the outcomes of the game, in the case of NB = 107. Figure 5(a)
shows the number of secured websites depending on the level of threat λ. The fraction
of remediated devices depending on the level of threat λ is shown in Figure 5(b). As
before, the three curves in Figures 5(a) and 5(b), correspond to the three scenarios
(PD = 0.1, PD = 0.5 and PD = 0.9).
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Fig. 5. Outcomes of the game applied to real data when NB = 107: (a) Number of the most
popular websites that should be secured; (b) Fraction of infected devices remediated by the ISP.
We observe the same behavior as in the case of NB = 104 bots in the system. The
difference in the results for the case ofNB = 107 (Figure 5) compared to results for the
case of NB = 104 (Figure 4 in Section 7) is that the threshold values of λ, for which
the AN begins to cooperate with the ISP, are higher. The explanation for this results is
the following.
When cooperating, the ISP remediates PDNB devices, and the AN pays PDNB ·
R to the ISP. Therefore, the cost of cooperation for the AN is higher when NB is
higher. Whereas, the benefit for the AN, due to remediation of NR = PDNB devices
is PλNRNB = PλPD, which does not depend on NB . For a given PD, the cooperation
benefit for the AN is higher only for the higher threat λ. Hence, when the number of bots
NB is high, the AN agrees to cooperate and pay the high cost PDNBR, only when the
fraction λ of the revenue bots divert is high. Because only for the high λ the cooperation
benefit PλPD is high enough to justify the costs of cooperation.
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Fig. 6. Threshold values of λ for which the AN begins cooperating with the ISP, in addition to
securing the websites.
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Figure 6 illustrates the threshold values of λ for different numbers of bots NB in
the system and for different efficiencies PD of the detection system. For example, in
the system with PD = 0.5 and NB = 104 the AN is cooperative when λ > 6.6 · 10−5.
Whereas, if NB is much higher, NB = 108, the AN is cooperative only if the fraction
of diverted revenue is much higher, λ > 0.8. The results confirm that for a system
with a given PD, when the number of bots is high, the AN is cooperative only when
the revenue loss is very high. Based on the results in Figure 6, we also observe that
the threshold value of λ does not vary much for different values of PD. Hence, we can
conclude that the value of NB is the dominant factor in the decision of the AN whether
to cooperate with the ISP or not. These results are also confirmed by Lemma 2.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the novel situation of ISPs and ad networks behaving
as strategic participants in the efforts to fight botnets. Due to the revenue loss caused by
botnet ad fraud, ad networks have economic incentives to protect their revenue by either:
(i) improving the security of the online advertising systems or (ii) fighting the major
cause of the revenue loss, botnets. To fight botnets, ad networks might need help from
ISPs, who are in a better position to deploy detection and remediation mechanisms.
We have proposed a game-theoretic model to study the behavior and interactions of
the ISPs and ad networks. We have applied our model to the real data to understand
the meaning of the results in practice. Our analysis shows that cooperation between the
AN and the ISP could emerge under certain conditions that mostly depend on: (i) the
number of infected devices (ii) the aggregate power with which bots divert revenue from
the ad network and (iii) the efficiency of the botnet detection system. The cooperation
is a win-win situation where: (i) users benefit from the ISP’s help in maintaining the
security of users’ devices; (ii) the AN protects its ad revenue as the botnet ad fraud is
reduced; (iii) it is at least cost neutral, if not cost positive for the ISP to fight botnets.
Cooperation between the AN and the ISP would help to reduce the level of online crime
and improve the Web security in general.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Wojciech Galuba, Julien Freudiger, and Mathias Humbert for
their insights and suggestions on earlier versions of this work, and the anonymous re-
viewers for their helpful feedback.
18 ISPs and Ad Networks Against Botnet Ad Fraud
References
1. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European parliament and of the council. Official Journal of the
European Union (2006)
2. 2008 Year-in-Review Benchmarks. DoubleClick Research Report (2009)
3. Biggest, Baddest Botnets: Wanted Dead or Alive. PC World (2009), http:
//www.pcworld.com/article/169033/biggest_baddest_botnets_
wanted_dead_or_alive.html
4. Click Fraud Index. ClickForennsics Inc. (2009)
5. Internet Advertising Revenue Report. Interactive Advertising Bureau (2009)
6. Adamic, L.A., Huberman, B.A.: The Web’s hidden order. Communication ACM (2001)
7. Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI), A.C., Media Authority: (2010), http://
www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/1001/pc=PC_310317
8. B. Mungamuru, S.W., Garcia-Molina, H.: Should Ad Networks Bother Fighting Click Fraud?
(Yes, They Should.). Technical report, Stanford InfoLab (2008)
9. Click Forensics Discovers Click Fraud Surge from New Sophisticated Bahama Botnet:
(2009), http://www.clickforensics.com/newsroom/press-releases/
144-bahama-botnet.html
10. Constantin, L.: German Government to Help Rid Computers of Malware (2009), http:
//news.softpedia.com
11. Crowcroft, J.: Net Neutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate: A White Paper. SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review (2007)
12. Daswani, N., Stoppelman, M.: The Anatomy of Clickbot.A. In: Hot Topics in Understanding
Botnets (HotBots) (2007)
13. Edelman, B.G.: Securing Online Advertising: Rustlers and Sheriffs in the New Wild West.
SSRN eLibrary (2008)
14. Edelman, B.G.: Deterring Online Advertising Fraud Through Optimal Payment in Arrears.
SSRN eLibrary (2009)
15. Gandhi, M., Jakobsson, M., Ratkiewicz, J.: Badvertisements: Stealthy Click-Fraud with Un-
witting Accessories. Digital Forensic Practice 1(2) (2006)
16. Viral Web infection siphons ad dollars from Google: http://www.theregister.co.
uk/2009/05/14/viral_web_infection/
17. Botnet caught red handed stealing from Google: (2009), http://www.theregister.
co.uk/2009/10/09/bahama_botnet_steals_from_google
18. Grossklags, J., Christin, N., Chuang, J.: Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of in-
formation security games. In: International conference on World Wide Web (WWW) (2008)
19. Growing number Of ISPs Injecting Own Content Into Websites: (2008), http://www.
techdirt.com/articles/20080417/041032874.shtml
20. J. Livingood, N. Mody, M.O., Communications, C.: Recommendations for the Remediation
of Bots in ISP Networks. Internet-Draft Version 3, IETF (2009)
21. Jakobsson, M., Ramzan, Z.: Crimeware. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA (2008)
22. Krishnamurthy, B., Wills, C.E.: Cat and Mouse: Content Delivery Tradeoffs in Web Access.
In: International conference on World Wide Web (WWW) (2006)
23. Lelarge, M., Bolot, J.: Economic Incentives to Increase Security in the Internet: The Case for
Insurance. In: INFOCOM (2009)
24. Livingood, J., Mody, N., O’Reirdan, M., Comcast Communications: ISP Voluntary Code
of Practice for Industry Self-regulation in the Area of e-security. Internet industry code of
practice, Internet Industry Association (2009)
25. Network Bluepill: Stealth Router-based Botnet: (2009), http://dronebl.org/blog
ISPs and Ad Networks Against Botnet Ad Fraud 19
26. Reis, C., Gribble, S.D., Kohno, T., Weaver, N.C.: Detecting In-Flight Page Changes with
Web Tripwires. In: USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation
(NSDI) (2008)
27. Cisco Intrusion Detection Systems: http://www.google.com/products?q=
cisco+intrusion+detection+system&aq=3&oq=cisco+in
28. VeriSign Inc: http://www.verisign.com/ssl/buy-ssl-certificates/
secure-site-services/index.html
29. Vratonjic, N., Freudiger, J., Felegyhazi, M., Hubaux, J.P.: Securing Online Advertising.
Technical report 2008-017, EPFL (2008)
30. Vratonjic, N., Freudiger, J., Hubaux, J.P.: Integrity of the Web Content: The Case of Online
Advertising. In: Usenix CollSec (2010)
31. Vratonjic, N., Raya, M., Hubaux, J.P., Parkes, D.C.: Security Games in Online Advertising:
Can Ads Help Secure the Web? In: Workshop on the Economics of Information Security
(WEIS) (2010)
32. Weisstein, E.: Euler-maclaurin integration formulas. MathWorld (2010), http://
mathworld.wolfram.com/Euler-MaclaurinIntegrationFormulas.html
33. Zhao, X., Fang, F., Whinston, A.B.: An economic mechanism for better Internet security.
Decision Support Systems 45(4) (2008)
